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Things were quite different for the coalition. Western powers have had access to a wide range of world-class technology, from space-based surveillance to remotely controlled systems such as robots and drones. But for them, the war in Afghanistan was not a war of survival; It was an election war. And therefore, most of the technology aimed at reducing the risk of death rather than achieving decisive victory. Western powers have invested heavily in weapons (air power, drones) that can save soldiers from any danger, or technology that can speed up emergency medical treatment. Things that keep the enemy at arm’s length or protect soldiers from harm, such as gunships, body armor, and roadside bomb detection, have been the focus of the West.

The West’s overarching military priority was elsewhere: in the war between the greater powers. Technologically, this means investing, for example, in hypersonic missiles to match those of China or Russia, or in military AI to try to defeat them.

Stuck between these two worlds, the Afghan government had more in common with the Taliban than with the coalition. This was not an election war, but a fundamental threat. Yet the government could not advance as the Taliban did; Its development was hampered by the fact that foreign armies provided the technologically advanced main forces. While the Afghan military and police certainly provide corpses to the war (with many casualties in the process), they are not in a position to build or even operate advanced systems on their own. Western countries were reluctant to equip Afghans with state-of-the-art weapons, fearing that they would be unsustainable or even fall into the hands of the Taliban.

Take the Afghan air force. Less than two dozen propeller aircraft were supplied and trained on these aircraft. This enabled some degree of close air support, but was far from cutting-edge. And working with the US meant that Afghanistan was not free to look elsewhere for technology transfer; in fact, it was stuck in a stunted stage of development.

So what is this trying to tell us? He says technology is not the driver of conflict or the guarantor of victory. Instead, it is an enabler. And even primitive weapons can carry the day in the hands of motivated, patient people who are ready and able to make whatever progress is required.

He also tells us that the battlefields of tomorrow could look a lot like Afghanistan: We’ll see less purely technological conflicts, where the military has the greatest firepower, and more old and new technology side-by-side. This is how it looks already in conflicts like between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the pattern is one that we will see more of over time. Technology may no longer win wars, but it can innovate – especially if one side is waging an existential war.

Christopher Ankersen He is a clinical associate professor of global affairs at New York University. He served at the United Nations in Europe and Asia from 2005 to 2017 and in the Canadian Armed Forces from 1988 to 2000. Civil Military Cooperation Policy and TThe Future of Global RelationsHe holds a PhD from the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Mike Martin He is a Pushtu-speaking former British army officer who served on several tours as a political officer in Afghanistan, advising British generals on their approach to war. He is currently a visiting war studies researcher and author at King’s College London. An Intimate WarIt has been mapping the war in southern Afghanistan since 1978. He holds a PhD from King’s College London.