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The third largest nuclear power in the world at the end of the Cold War was not Britain, France or China. It was Ukraine. The Soviet collapse, a slow-motion decline that culminated in December 1991, resulted in the newly independent Ukraine being roughly inherited. 5,000 nuclear weapons That Moscow settled on its own land. Underground silos at military bases carried long-range missiles, which carried up to 10. thermonuclear warheadsEach one is much more powerful than the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima. Only Russia and the USA had more weapons.

Removing this arsenal is usually hailed as a victory for gun control. Diplomats and peace activists cite Ukraine as an exemplary citizen in a nuclear-powered world.

But history shows that denuclearization was a chaotic upheaval between the country’s government and military, crippled by internal conflicts, flashbacks, and disagreements. At the time, both Ukrainian and American experts questioned the wisdom of atomic disarmament. Some argued that deadly weapons were the only reliable way to deter Russian aggression.

Ukraine today has no easy way of producing or acquiring the materials needed to make bombs. Even so, the nuclear genie is once again in motion as Russian troops encircle the country and wage a shadow war in its easternmost provinces.

“We gave up the talent for nothing,” said Andriy Zahorodniuk, the former defense minister of Ukraine. Referring to the security assurances Ukraine has earned in exchange for its nuclear weapons, he added: “Now, when someone offers us to sign a strip of paper, the response is ‘Thank you very much. We had one of these a while ago.’”

Western analysts say the current Ukrainian mood tends to romanticize the atomic past. “The point is, ‘We had guns, we left them, and now look what happens,'” he said. Mariana Budjeryn, a Ukraine expert at Harvard University. “At the policy level, I don’t see any movement towards any reassessment. But at the popular level, that’s the narrative.”

A native of Ukraine, Dr. “Regret is part of it,” Budjeryn said in an interview. “The other part is whatever one feels as a result of being wronged.”

First, Ukraine has rushed To remove Soviet weapons from their territory. The relatively small warheads on bombs, cannonballs, land mines, and short-range missiles were the easiest to carry and were most likely to fall into hostile hands. More difficult to maneuver were the long-range missiles, which weighed 100 tons and could reach an altitude of about 90 feet.

In January 1992, a month after the end of the Soviet Union, Ukraine’s president and defense minister ordered military commanders and his men pledging allegiance to the new country – a move that would exert administrative control over the remaining weapons. Many refused, and the soldiers who commanded Ukraine’s nuclear forces fell into a period of tense confusion over the fate and operational state of the arsenal.

Volodymyr TolubkoA former nuclear base commander elected to the Ukrainian Parliament argued that Kiev should never give up on atomic power. in April 1992, told the parliament He insisted that Ukraine’s declaration of itself as a non-nuclear state was “romantic and premature” and that it should retain at least some of its long-range warheads. He declared that now a missile force would be sufficient to “deter any aggressor”.

While his stance never garnered widespread support, it “increased existing tensions”. a detailed history Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament

In the summer of 1993, John J. Mearsheimera leading international relations theorist at the University of Chicago. no stranger to controversylent his voice to the topic of keeping atomic. he Discussed in Foreign Affairs Ukraine said the nuclear arsenal was “obligatory” to “keep the peace”. He added that deterrence would ensure that “Russians with a history of bad relations with Ukraine do not take action to reconquer it.”

In Kiev, the government went so far in 1993: consider taking operational control nuclear missiles and bombers. But that never happened.

Instead, Ukraine punted. He demanded that he need solid security guarantees in exchange for nuclear disarmament. This was… heart of the deal It was signed in Moscow in early 1994 by Russia, Ukraine and the United States.

In late 1994, commitments fleshed out. agreement known as Budapest MemorandumThe agreement signed by Russia, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States promised that no country would use force or threat against Ukraine and that they would all respect its sovereignty and existing borders. The agreement also promised that if aggression did occur, the signatories would take immediate action from the United Nations Security Council to assist Ukraine.

While Kiev didn’t get what it wanted – the legally binding guarantees that would come with a formal agreement approved by the US Senate – it did receive assurances from Washington that it would take its political commitments as seriously as its legal obligations. According to Budjeryna research analyst Managing the Atom Project at the Kennedy School at Harvard.

Ukraine in May 1996 the last of its nuclear weapons Sent back to Russia. The returns took half a decade.

What spoiled the diplomatic success was the “collective failure” of Washington and Kiev to account for the rise of someone like him. Vladimir V.PutinSteven Pifer, Budapest Memorandum negotiator and former US ambassador to Ukraine now at Stanford University, he said in an interview. After Russian troops invaded Crimea in early 2014 and precipitated a proxy war in eastern Ukraine, Mr. Budapest rejects the deal invalid and void.

“They have been fighting a low-grade war for eight years,” said Mr. Pifer, who had just returned from Kiev. “You won’t find bullets in stores. Many civilians are taking up arms.”

Invasion of Crimea and protracted war in Ukraine, a series of calls Author of “Inheriting the Bomb” Dr. For the rearmament of the atom, according to Budjeryn. an upcoming book From Johns Hopkins University Press.

In March 2014, Volodymyr Ohryzko, a former foreign minister, argued that Ukraine now has the moral and legal right to re-establish its nuclear status. In July, an ultranationalist parliamentary bloc introduced a bill to regain the arsenal. A poll conducted later that year showed that the public had about 50 percent approval for nuclear rearmament.

Last year, Andriy Melnyk, Ukrainian Ambassador to Germany, said Kiev If it can’t become a NATO member, it can look at nuclear weapons. “How else can we guarantee our defence?” Mr. Melnyk asked. The State Department denied that such options were being considered.

Dr. Western experts, including Budjeryn, view Ukraine’s actions and threats as empty gestures, given the tangle of scientific, logistical, financial and geopolitical challenges Kiev will face if it chooses nuclear rearmament. Kiev may face the same dilemmas as Tehran, which has been steadily working for decades to obtain the technical information and materials needed to build a bomb – Ukraine apparently lacks these.

More broadly, experts fear that the current crisis could turn Ukraine from an example of arms control benefits to one of atomic disarmament risks and push Ukraine further. Iranians and Saudi Arabia world to pursue their own nuclear weapons programs.

“Unless a diplomatic solution is reached, it will reinforce the impression that nuclear-armed states can bully non-nuclear states,” said Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association in Washington, and thus “reduce incentives” for disarmament.

Former ambassador to Ukraine, Mr. Pifer, argued in an interview and 2019 analysis He said the high costs of rearmament will ultimately include Ukraine finding itself alone in any crisis or conflict with Russia.

“Many countries support Ukraine,” he said of the current standoff. However, if the nation goes nuclear, “that support will dry up quickly,” Mr. Pifer added.

Andrew E Kramer Contributed to reporting from Moscow.